

**International Cooperation for Social Development:  
Practitioners Reports and Critical Reflections  
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***Integrating Macro and Micro Approaches: The Case of  
Swiss-Mozambican Cooperation***

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
I would like now to come to a specific micro example of what Mr. Greminger has been discussed from a macro perspective.

The objective of my speech will be to link major aspects of mine action to the broader view of socio-economic reconstruction and the capacity building of local authorities.

I assume that not every one of you here today is completely familiar with what we call mine action. I will therefore give you a brief introduction to the field. After that I will attempt to explain the various approaches to an appropriate mine action policy in Mozambique both from a donor's and from the perspective of the country concerned. As an example I will take our mine action programme in Mozambique, its emergence and implementation.

Let me now give you an introduction to the basics of mine action.

## Issues in the field of actions against antipersonnel mines



What is the Mine Ban Treaty?

- history: the huge movement of NGOs that resulted in a Convention
- requirements of the treaty
- instruments of the treaty
- political objectives (universalisation and implementation)

Fields and aspects of mine action according to the Standing Committees of the MBT:

- mine clearance / humanitarian demining
- ✍ methods: manual and/or mechanical demining, use of dogs
- ✍ standards: 99,96% cleared, security (equipment, first aid) and assurance

- ✍ local capacities (sustainability, price)
- ✍ commercial vs humanitarian demining
  
- victim assistance
  - ✍ care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims
  - ✍ part of social health system
  
- mine awareness
  - ✍ prevention of accidents caused by mines
  - ✍ education in schools
  - ✍ campaigns
  
- mine clearing technology
  - ✍ development of new techniques to clear and destroy mines
  - ✍ study of best practice
  - ✍ setting of standards
  
- stockpile destruction
  - ✍ destroy stockpiled mines

What is included in a mine action policy of a mine affected country?

- definition of socio-economic criteria
- priority setting
- tasking
- coordination
- control

What is included in a mine action policy of a donor country?

- definition of criteria for assistance
- setting of priorities for assistance
- focus on few (most affected) countries
- respect for the needs of the selected countries
- capacity building if needed
- identification of projects together with responsible authority, other donors and possible partners (through assessment mission)
- application of an integrated mine action programme
- definition of criteria for funding (including guidelines for project application)
- choice of best proposals and partners according to UN standards, efficiency, sustainability, politics, experience
- provision of monitoring mechanism
- control of reporting and the use of means

After this rather long introduction let me now come back to the example of Mozambique.

Based on the above-mentioned objectives of good donor policy we decided last year to concentrate our mine action activities on two regions (Mozambique and South-Eastern Europe) and to assess the needs and possibilities for support. We conducted in September last year an assessment mission to Mozambique in order to identify needs and to define an integrated mine action programme. This country was chosen because

- it is still one of the most mine-affected countries in the world;
- we have very active and reliable structures in Mozambique (I am referring mainly to the coordination bureau of the Swiss Development Agency, which is directed by Thomas Greminger);
- Mozambique is a very positive example of sustainable peace building (the Section I work in is responsible for peace building and we are increasingly trying to link demining with peace building projects)
- the responsible authority for mine action had recently appointed a new director we assumed to be cooperative and aware of the most relevant needs.

Our mission agenda mainly consisted of talking: we met the director of the National Demining Institute of Mozambique (IND), representatives of the most important donors (Canada, Finland, Norway, USA and the Netherlands) and NGOs (Halo Trust, HI and the Mozambican ADP – missing only NPA).

We knew that it would be difficult to generate a reasonable programme without the agreement of these players. Especially important to us was the role of IND. Experience with the former authority known as CND and its former Director Colonel Osorio showed that cooperation with Mozambique's officials in mine action was almost impossible. A group of donors achieved in May 1999 – after several attempts and a lot of pressure – a change of director. However, most of the donors had already lost confidence after years of disappointment and waited to see for improvements before committing themselves. They therefore welcomed our courage to cooperate fully with IND and its new director Artur Verissimo, and our willingness to accept the risk of a failure.

Verissimo described what the Institute's basic problems were: It had neither financial nor personal resources; none of his staff - except himself and his deputy - had a university degree or spoke English (a real problem if you consider that most donors and NGOs involved in mine action communicate in

English); there was only one computer available; all of the experts trained for the management of mine data had left because of low salaries.

Verissimo knew what IND's tasks consisted of, namely to submit national policy strategies and action plans, to gather, analyse and provide data on mines in Mozambique, to coordinate and control mine activities including tendering, to set priorities and standards, to plan, to provide technical assistance and quality assurance, to educate and raise awareness about mines, to provide information, carry out public relations and raise funds, finally to manage and coordinate funds and administration.

However, none of these tasks could at that time been carried out by the IND itself.

Verissimo knew quite well what he needed for the first steps: qualified people, computers and a regional office to supervise the activities in the north of the country – a modest but yet effective request for a start.

Switzerland financed a kick-start capacity-building package covering the needs that Verissimo and we had identified.

In a second step we wanted to rely on the capacity we had helped to build and checked its functioning. We therefore asked IND-director Verissimo for a demining

priority and a local company he would find through tendering for demining operations.

IND was very pleased that Switzerland respected IND's responsibility for priority setting and tendering. It seems that we were the first donor-country to do this.

Of the priority projects he offered, we chose a territory where Mozambique planned to build a training centre for police forces – a project that we could perfectly link to Switzerland's support of the Mozambique's security reforms. Concerning the demining operation itself we aimed at a double capacity building and therefore took a double risk: On the one hand we wanted IND to provide the services it was set up for, namely to choose appropriate partners, to supervise the project and to carry out quality control. At the same time – and this was one more challenge to IND and ourselves – we intended to promote local business by accepting a tendering process. We had no assurance that the project would work out properly and that the 600'000 Swiss francs invested would produce a worthwhile result.

Accordingly, we tried on the other hand to lower the risk as far as possible. By emphasising our special partnership with South Africa we asked a South African company to follow the process, check the



proposals and to provide management skills on the job.

Now you would certainly like to know how all this finally worked out. I unfortunately cannot tell you yet: We are at the very beginning of the project.

But, I would like to say, good preparation accounts for half of a project's success – especially in war-torn countries which are in the process of peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic development. This said, I will try to draw some conclusions, attempting to combine micro and macro perspectives. Since lots of problems and failures in socio-economic development are related to the lack of care by donors, I'll do this not primarily from a scientific but from a donor's perspective.

### Conclusions / recommendations

- every single project should fit in the overall sector policy
- we need a sound knowledge of the political and socio-economic context we work in
- it is essential to analyse the interests of all major actors in the field
- one should create an overview of ongoing and planned activities, help to coordinate them and identify gaps

furthermore we should bear in mind that it is important to:

- work through responsible authorities wherever possible
- invest in capacities – empower your partners
- provide learning-by-doing opportunities
- monitor the process and the result
- be a reliable partner by medium and longterm commitment

and, last but not least, two very general but essential remarks

- think of your work as being part of a long-term process bearing the sustainability in mind
- choose your approach in a way that ownership is with your local partners

Thank you for your attention